After bringing in a former MVP and an additional All-Star, Bruce Arena seemed to have the tools to create a potent offense last year. Despite the insane talent across the front line, the attackers’ individual performances failed to lift the team.
A year later, with a less high-profile offense, the Quakes found success with a more balanced attack.
Going into last season, concerns remained over the team’s defensive potential, but the attack promised to be dynamite. Looking only at the players’ performances rather than the team’s, most would have expected them to be a playoff side.
The additions of Chicho Arango and Josef Martínez promised to give Arena options that most MLS coaches dream of. To be fair, the trio of Arango, Martínez, and Cristian Espinoza performed well individually, with each player posting strong seasons. However, the overlapping playing styles of Arango and Martinez ultimately capped the ceiling of their partnership.
With a less talented frontline, on paper at least, Arena struck gold by adopting a simpler system. Rather than an attack featuring multiple goal-scoring threats, this iteration focuses on creating chances through multiple playmakers. Ultimately, Arena’s changes resulted in a more consistent frontline that focuses on balance above all else.
In the first transfer window under Arena’s helm, Chris Leitch and his team pulled off a number of impressive coups.
Getting Arango relatively cheaply and Martinez on a free transfer gave the manager a foundation that should have helped the team break through.
Ultimately, the issues for the front line stemmed from the players’ playing styles and the formations used by Arena. Especially as the season spiraled downwards, in desperate need of a spark, the manager doubled down on the underperforming trio. This allowed for both Arango and Martínez to stat pad, but failed to save the team.
When Arena moved to the 3-4-3, the hope was that by playing all three star forwards, the offense would overpower opponents. Rather than aiding the team, the shift only allowed for the individual players to succeed. Very rarely did all three play well during a single game. Espinoza remained the most consistent.
The failure for them to synchronize came down to the imbalance created by the move to a front three. While Espinoza continued to produce chances on the right, Arango and Martínez ended up stepping on each other’s feet too often.
To have gotten the most from these additions, Martinez would have had to come off the bench, but that was never going to happen. Instead, Arena pushed Arango to the left so he could cut into the space created by Martinez. In theory, this combination gave the team two threats on goal that would occupy defenders’ minds.
Rather than adding another dimension to the team, the two players often got in each other’s way. Neither player played well with the other; in fact, by the end of the season, only Martínez felt like a positive addition. For as good as Espinoza continued to play, his lack of a goal-scoring threat limited his impact.
What promised to be the team’s best chance at a potent attack ultimately collapsed like so many other attempts. Arena realized this by the end of the season, but it was already too late.
Outside of Timo Werner, the Quakes entered this season without making any additions to their front line.
All three players whom they pinned their hopes on in 2025 left, leaving behind uninspiring choices.
Reverting to a 4-2-3-1, Arena simplified his offensive scheme with fewer options across the frontline. Rather than having two prolific goal scorers and a mercurial talent on the wing, the manager hoped that a more balanced attack would produce better outputs.
At the core of this formation is the use of the number ten, which fully unlocked this offense’s potential. Additionally, using wingers who primarily look to create chances for the striker rather than go to goal helps pull everything together. Finally, playing with only one striker focused on scoring avoids many of the overlapping issues from last season.
After spending a few seasons on the fringe of the roster, Niko Tsakiris finally broke out this season in his new number ten role. Free to roam across the pitch to form passing triangles with the wingers, midfield, or striker, he gives a dimension that they never really had, even with Espinoza. Tsakiris offers the team a release valve, no matter where the buildup starts.
The wingers who play off of Tsakiris fit the Espinoza mold rather than Arango, which helps add more balance to the team. With or without Werner, the winger’s goal remains to create space for Tsakriris to operate by acting as an outlet to cross. When Werner plays, there is more dynamism on the left flank, given that the German remains a lethal scorer.
Credit: San Jose EarthquakesPreston Judd and Josef Martinez share several similarities that make both good fits for any Arena system. Pure poachers, they both relish the chance to take a shot in the box, which this current iteration of the Quakes does well to provide. Judd, however, plays like a throwback to an earlier era of MLS, using his tools to punish backlines.
By returning to a more traditional system, the team’s front line finally gives them a chance against any MLS team. Focusing on giving the attack more balance paid off with a roster that most expected to be near the bottom of the league.
Last season, the high-profile additions of Arango and Martinez promised fans a chance to watch what could be the league’s best attack. The front line’s imbalance cost them any chance at making progress, which Arena clearly understood.
Choosing to go so far in that direction eventually helped the team transform into real contenders this year.
